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In R oman Catholic moral theology, it has always been held
t hat one can make an adequately
moral decision only when all the
reasonably available pertinent information is in hand. With regard
to the moral problems of procreation, Pope Paul VI has adopted
the phrase " responsibl e parenthood," and noted t.hat. a variety
of circumstances may lead responsible parents "to avoid for
the time being, or even for an indeterminate period, a new birth.'"
The notion of genetic responsibility has taken on great significance in recent years.2 In the
past, parents have of course al·
ways hoped that their children
would be born healthy; they have
struggled, sometimes heriocally,
to care for children during illness
or th rough infirmity. But only
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recently has the possibility of determining ahead 0/ time the ge·
netic well-being of children become a reali ty.
Genetic counseling can provide, fo r many people, precise
information about genetic disease
in children a lready born, about
t he risk of recurrence, a bout
prognosis, and e.,en about the
genetic status of a fetus in the
womb. This kind of information
has helped transform procreation
into an activity subject to more
deliberate choices than used to
be the case.
It is to be expected that society, both secular and eccIesial,
will increasingly consider that mature persons should demonstrate
active responsibility with respect
to the genetic health of their
prospective children.] We already
look fo r this in terms of such
things as provision of a place to
live, financial resources to insure
adequate food , clothing, education, etc.
For purposes of this discussion,
concern for genetic well-being of
as-yet-unborn persons is eugenics.
It is important to distinguish two
types of eugenics. Positive eugenics is the systematic attempt
to increase desira ble hereditary
traits. Negative eugenics is the
systematic attempt to decrease
undesirable hereditary t r a i ts.
Linacre Quarterly

Eugenic programs are societal
structures designed to change the
genetic heritage of whole populat ions. Eugenic decisions are
made by individual families (one
husband and one wire) concerning the genetic heritage and status of their own present and/ or
prospective ch ild (ren).
One can isolate at least thirteen major ethical issues which
obtain in genetic counseling (Table l). ~ Some issues pertain exclusively to those who run the
genetics clinic, while others concern the family which comes for
genetic counseling. In this essay,
I propose to explore the dimensions of parental genetic responsibility and the considerations
which enter their genetic decision-making.
Table ]
Ethical issues in human genetics
1) informed consent for experimentation
2) parental responsibility for
genetic health (a priori)
3) parental responsibility for
nurture of the defective chi ld
(a posteriori)
4) privacy of information vis-auis at-risk relatives
5) privacy of information vis-auis society at large
6) methods of family plan implementation
7) abortion
B) methods of weighing factors
in decision-making
9) eugenic concerns
10) qualifications of a genetic
counselor
November, 1976

11) structure of genetic counseling (clinic)
12) provision/ withholding of information to/ from counselee
13) quality of participation in
the process of decision-making.
It should be explicated here
that my concern is exclusively
with negative eugenic decisions.
There is virtually unanimous
agreement that eugenic programs,
whether positive or negative, do
not yet offer sufficient promise
to warrant the compromising of
human freedoms which they
would inevitably entai l. Furthermore, positive eugenic decisions
(with the exception of deliberate
assortative mating) are not at
this time possible except as experimental procedures. As such,
they entail unquantified risks
which may constitute a strong
argument against their acceptability} While the s e deserve
attention, they are of less immediate urgency than are negative eugenic decisions, which for
a long time will continue to occupy most of the energies expended in and around genetics
clinics. Positive eugenic decisions,
in any case, can be subjected to
an ethical dissection very s imilar
to the one applied here to negative eugenic decisions.
I undertake this discussion
with c e r t a i n presuppositions.
First, I assume that parents have
a strong desire to act responsibly
in this matter, and that they are
of average intelligence and education .6 Second, I assume that
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the increasing publicity about genetic counseling has reached
them, whet.her through the mass
media or the agency of family
physicians, clergy, relatives 01'
friend s. (If t hey are una ware of
the availability and applicability
of genetic counseling, they cannot be expected to seek it.)
Third, I assume that genetic
counselors adhere to the strictest
discipline of non-directive counseling, seeking a I wa y s to be
helpers, in fonners, supporters,
encouragers for the family, bu t
always insisting t ha t the famil y
must make its own decision (s) J
Fourth, I assume that the genetic
condit ion about which a decision
is to be made is one that poses a
serious burden of suffering to the
family (i.e., a non- trivial nega tive
eugenic decision ).
To Whom Responsible?
We cannot impute moral responsibility to a person in a
vacuum ; we must make it clear
to whom (s) he is answerable for
actions. Table II lists (in roughly
descending order of weight) those
dimensions of responsibili ty which
can be identified for genetic decision-making.

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Table II
Dimensions of genetic
responsibility·
between spouses
parents to child (ren) a posteriori
parents to child(ren) a priori
genetic counselee(s ) to relative(s) at risk
spouses t o society at large
spouses to pos terity a t large
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7) genetic counselee (s ) to genetic counselor (s)
· spouses - parents - genetic
counselees = decision-makers
1) Between spouses. Most people never have a ny reason to suspect that they may have or ca rry a genetic disease posing a
threat to prospective children.
(Choice of a spouse ma y involve,
to be sure, a more or less conscious posilive eugenic consideration.) Bu t occasionally one's
family or personal health history
reveals a heredita ry problem. In
such cases, it is a matter of basic
honesty that this be disclosed to
one's prospective spouse. 1t is
simply an element in t he mutual
self-revelat ion tha t is part of the
speciaUy intense human relationship of marriage. I have argued
elsewhere t hat deliberate concealment of such information
probably constitutes grounds for
a nnulment of ma rriage even within the strict canonical discipline
of the Roman Catholic Church:"
Whether the genetic bad news
an tedates marriage or enters as
a n unpleasant surprise wi th the
birth of an affected child, spouses
a re responsible to one another for
an adequate approach to the
necessary subsequent decisionmaking. It is not sufficient for
one to acquiesce silently to the
other's reproductive inclinations.
To do so would compromise the
mu tuality of decision-making
which is essential in the marriage
relationship. A one-sided decision
in matters of gen etics can set the
stage for major problems in the
Linacre Quarterly

future , especially if the consequences of the ill-made choice include birth of a seriously affected
child.9
2) Parents to child(ren) a posteriori. Extant children , whether
or not they are suffering from th e
disease in question, have a claim
on their parents to reach genetic
d ec i s ion s carefull y. The child
(ren) must s har e the consequences of these decisions.
3) Parents to child( rerz) a
p r io r i. Over 2000 hereditary
health problems are now known. tO
Their severity ranges from complete triviality to tremendous
burdens of protracted suffering.
Depending on the severity of the
condition in question, parents
will need to take account of the
risk of suffering to which they
may expose the prospective child(ren) whose conception is being
contemplated. The quality of life
reasonably foreseeable should be
considered. A ch ild who su ffers
later, from a preventable condi:
tion, may accuse his or her parents of negligence. On the other
hand, if the choice is lire with
suffering as opposed to non-existence, the child's case may be difficu lt to argue.
4) Genetic counselee(s) to relatives at risk. Most genetic COllns e lor s and commen tators on
medical ethics agree that a person found to have or carry a serious genetic disease ought to allow
his or her physician to inform
any relatives who may also be at
risk of suffering the condition
themselves or in their children. It
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has been argued that this is a
threat to privacy or may lead to
social or familial stigmatization. II
But if adequate counseling is provided to all involved, it should be
possible to main tain a balanced
understanding of the problem
and its implications. There is a
significant moral obligation rest ing on a per so n who holds
imp o r ta n t information about
someone else to reveal that inform ation in order to provide
that person at least the opportunity of using it in his or her own
life decisions.I J
5) Spou ses to society at large.
The relationship of a fam ily to
society at large is complex. Each
makes certain demands of the
other. But society is not a single
monolithic entity, much less a
person. 1l A family will not relate
to its society as it does to its

friends, relatives, neighbors or
colleagues. I ts sense of responsibility to society takes the shape
of an active desire to playa constructive role in t he wide sweep of
human progress. There will be
concern to avoid demanding of
its city, state, or nation any assistance which it can reasonably
provide fo r itself.
In turn , the people who make
up society, and who contribute to
whatever common fund may be
available for special needs, have
legitimate claim on the individual
family to actively avoid unnecessary withdrawals:
6) Spous es to posterity at
large. Prospective grandchildren
may be at risk of suffering or
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gaining by genetic decisions. So
might prospective great-grandchildren. There is some virtue in
recognizing that any really important decision made by me in
1976 may have repercussions not
only in the 1980's, but also during t he 2080's.
I have argued elsewhere, u at
some length, that the legitimate
place fo r large eugenic concerns
in the genetic decision-making
process is the place freely given
to them by the decision-makers:
t he (prospective ) parents. If a
eugenic counselor has personal
eugenic views, (s)he will act responsibly to keep these from being an obstacle to the counselees.
since it is to the latter that the
decision fall s as an act of a moral
agent. Nor should a society that
claims to be democratic, and to
hold freedom of self·detenninat ion as a prime value, contemplate any legislative interference
in this decisional process. To do
so would be not only a compromise of t he moral process (decision-agency, which can reside
only in a person or a family but
not in a state ) , but also a be·
trayal of stated secular values.
Calculating genetic responsibility to posterity many generations removed is perhaps an
empty theoretical exercise. But
it is reasonable to expect that the
persons of the 23rd century, in
examining history, will hold us
responsible for having opened or
closed our eyes to t he challenges
and possibilities of the 20th.
7) Genetic counseLee{s} to genetic cou1l$elor{s} . It is of course
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important that genetic counselees
and genetic counselors establish
a good working relationship if
their encounter is to make a positive contribu tion to the difficult
process of genetic decision-mak.
ing. Primarily, the counselor
team is cast in roles of service.
But it should be obvious that the
counselees will receive help only
to the extent that t hey are open
to it. This calls fo r a) providing
diagnosticians and counselors
with adequate answers to their
questions, and b) making the
best effort to "hear" what is being offered them in the counseling sessions, even though the
news may be unwelcome.
How to Reach a Decision
It is hopefully clear that the
seven persons and groups of persons discussed above do not have
equ.al claim on the attention and
moral agency of genetic decisionmakers. Listing t he elements to
be considered in reaching these
decisions, I likewise do not wish
to imply equal gravity. At least
ten such elements can be recognized in dissecting the complex
dynamics of genetic decisionmaking process (Table 111 ).15
Table III
Considerations in parental
genetic decision·making
1) own capacities for care, fo r
suffering
2) status of marital relationship
3) impact on extant child (ren)
4) foreseeable suffering of prospective child (ren )
5) financial capacities
6) reproductive options
Linacre Quarterly

7) moral commitments and conflicts
B) burden to society for support
9) eugenic considerations
10) reasons fo r technological optimism
1) Own capacities. People who
have given birt.h to a child with
some unexpected deleterious genetic condition often suffer feelings of "cosmic g uilt ." '~ They
may undergo severe strains of
doubts about themselves and
their own goodness as persons.
This kind of shock-reaction may
last fo r days, weeks, or months,
and may be further complicated
by an understandable sense of
loss and appropriate grief reaction. ( In a sense, they have lost
the healthy child whose birth
had been a nticipated.) Genetic
decisions un d e r such circumstances are difficult if not impossi ble.
A good counselor will help
them through t his period to a
time when they can ra tionally
take stock of t hemselves in terms
of their capacity, as persons, to
care for a n (other) affected child.
Foreseeing one's stamina in the
face of suffering is notoriously
difficult, but it should be obvious
that self-evaluation must be part
of an adequate decision process.
2) Marital relationship. I have
noted above that spouses are responsible to each other for selfdisclosure in the matter of serious
genetic health problems and/ or
risks to offspring, and for mutuali ty in entering the genetic decision process. I t can further be
November, 1976

observed t hat a couple experiencing marital stress should never
initiate a pregnancy, genetic risks
aside. Responsible persons will
wait until such storms resolve,
and then include the quality of
their ever-unfinished relationship
among the factors pertinent to
undertaking the risks of procreationY
3 ) Extant child(ren). There
are two kinds of extant chil dren
in a fam ily faced with a genetic
decision.
a) There may be genetically
" healthy" children (at least, unaffected by the condition in question ). If t hey a re already living
with a handicapped sibling, it
may be seen as an undue burden
on them to risk another's birth.
On t he other hand, the experience of dealing with the special
problems of living with an affect.ed person may be seen as a positive element in their education as
sensitive persons. They may also
perceive parental activity in deliberately choosing at least one
major aspect of children's genetic
makeup as a n indirect affirmation of t hemselves (that their
parents chose and value t hem as
they are) . Or they might perceive
this as a threa t (that they could
have been j udged inadequate,
never brought to life, or selectively aborted). I am not aware of
any research having been done to
quantify these poten tial hazards
and benefits.
b) If the genetic condition in
question first came to attention
with the birt h of an affected child
(as opposed to having been as285

certained prior to any procreation), that child may be living
during and after genetic decisions. All the same considerations
apply here as were mentioned for
" normal" children, except that
for this child the possible feelings
of affirmation or rejection may be
amplified due to recognition of
self as being at the center of the
crisis and its sequelae.
Furthermore, the prognosis for
the extant aHected child will be
a factor in decision-making. Does
t he foreseeable burden of management obviate the human possibility of caring for another such
child ... or even of an additional
healthy child?
Finally, some of the genetic decisions parents face focus not pri marily on further procreation,
but on the extant affected child.
Based on the natural history of
a known condition (as explained
to them by genetic counselors),
parents will have to make choices
am 0 n g management options,
which may include a lmost any
imaginable combination of the
foliowing;1 8 ordinary tender loving care, repeated medical followup visits, special dietary regimen,
medications, special education,
t herapy, prosthesis, surgery, respite ca re, adopt ion out of the
family, institutionalization, epallobiosis,19 enthetobiosis,1 9 heroic
experiments,2o allowing the child
to die by withholding all but
minimal care. 21
4) Foreseeable suffe r ing of
prospective child(ren}. Some parents will consider the burden of,
for example, hemophilia too great
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to tolerate giving birth to a son
when they know themselves to be
at risk. Others will think that
current therapy for the type of
hemophilia they face is adequate
fo r them to expect a reasonably
normal, happy a nd productive life
fo r their child. These two fami lies
will make different decisions, but
the need to assess the foreseeable
burden to the prospective child is
obvious.22
Burden calculus may depend
largely on the quality of counseling provided to the fam ily. In
conditions for which prenatal diagnosis does not apply, or for
families who completely reject
'selective abortion as a means of
avoiding birth of an a ffected
child, the recurrence risk will be
an important factor in decision.
Not many people would look
quietly upon a 50% risk for a
major disease, but some would be
comfortable with a 25% risk.
Others would avoid procreation
because of a 5% risk, even for a
condi tion which an outside observer thinks to be relatively minor. Et cetera.
Not every genetic problem is
necessarily always to be shunned.
It is impossible to conclude that
giving birth to a child with, for
example, the D own syndrome, is
per se a moral evil; " normality"
is " better," but persons with this
condition are not unmitigated defects to famil y and society.2l
The possibility of experimental
procedures may enter here. Parents' informed consent is a delicate matter. Assuming it can be
adequately infonned, that conLinacre Quarterly

sent may be appropriate to attempt novel approaches to prevention , treatment, etc.
5) Financial capacities. It is
an unfort unate anomaly in our
society that we affirm freedom of
self-detennination in matters like
genetic decision-making, but fail
to follow through with unconditional commitment to help bear
the weight of management in
health crises. This is true even fo r
situations in which there was no
opportuni ty to anticipate the
problem. As a society, we are in
need of a radical conversion to
mut.ual support in ca tastrophic
health problems. Until such a
commitment is made, t he spectre
of bankruptcy haunts those making genetic decisions.!1
6) Reproductive options. Assuming, with Pope Paul VI , tha t
responsib le parents deliberately
choose the number and spacing
of thei r children , one should expect that genetic counseling may
further their understanding of
the reproductive opt ions available a nd appl icable to effect their
genetic decisions. These include,
of course: periodic a bstinence
from intercourse, cont raceptive
devices and chemicals, sterilization, by various means, of one
part.ner, artificial insemination by
husband or donor, prenatal diagnosis a nd selective abortion ,: '
adop tion, experimenta l procedures (e.g. embryo implantat ion), divorce, and the status
quo.
The las t.-mentioned is importa nt. Some famili es will decide to
make no cha nges in their previNovember, 1976

ous fam ily plans. When I go to
such lengths to delineate the dimensions and considera tions of
parental genetic responsibility, I
do not assume that responding to
new infonnation necessarily leads
to any concrete changes in procreative plans. I in tend only to
urge t hat there exists a moral
obligation to respond actively
a nd make decisions deliberately.
Thus, I do not think it will ever
be considered " responsible" for
parents to consciously avoid acquisition and impl ementation of
avaiJable information pertinent to
the health of their prospective
children/Ii provided of course
that this information includes
some options a nd is noL simply
a n imposition of additional tension.
7) Moral com mitments and
conflicts. People have moral commitments. They have cherished
notions of wha t is right and what.
is wrong. Often, these are only
pa rtiall y explicit. Often, they a re
part of larger personal dedicat iom; to religious systems of belief. Unfortunately, genetic decisions often present parents wi th
a direct confl ict. of two or more
deeply cherished va lues. This
may plunge them int.o what has
been called "moral su ffering."21
Support and encouragement by
clergy, physicians, or othe~ who
sha re the parents' moral atti t udes
can be a creative service. Decision-making seen in li ght of moral
suffering is evident.ly a profound
challenge to the moral agen t. One
can hope t hat people who enter
such a struggle wit.h generosity
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and courage will emerge victorious at least in the sense that they
will have grown together as persons and as a family. But to say
this is not in any way to suggest
that they will not be in pain, as
they weigh genetic facts against
conflicting values. Cursory inspection of the management and
reproductive options listed above
will provide a host of immediately obvious conflicts that may
arise in the minds and hearts of
conscientious, highly motivated
(prospective) parents.
8 ) Bu.rden to society. Parents
will sometimes fa ll back on societal resources to help them cope
with the problems of caring fo r an
affected child. The other side of
this coin, of course, is that they
should consider their neighbors'
potential sacrifices in this rega rd.
This is not to extenuate societal
responsibility to provide such
help (as noted ahove). But it is
importan t that the individual
family disdain to perceive societal
structures of support as guaranteed cushions on which to rest
while abrogating responsibil ity to
reach difficult decisions fo r themselves. 2R
9) Eugenic decisions and future generations at large. Ea rlier
I asserted that what we know
about human genetics and the
potential problems or hopes in
eugenic programs is insufficiently
compelling to justify compromising the val u e s of freedom of
self-determination in genetic decision-making. This does not remove eugenic concern in the wide
population sense from the list of
288

legitimate considerations in the
minds of parents. 29 Like family
size limitation partially motivated by environmental concern and
a sense of responsibility for population size limitation, eugenic
decisions may well rest in part on
an awareness of the possible wide
repercussions of an indjvidual's
procreative decisions.
To reiterate, hmvever, the
place for this kind of eugenic concem is only the place given it by
the genetic counselees. So long
as their freedom of choice remains unimpaired by intrusive
legislation , no counselor is jus tified in imposing a eugenic program. l O To do so is to betray the
trust on which counseling relationships must be founded.
10) An element of hope. Naivete and despair are extreme positions, and as such are both deplorable. 31 Insofar as is possible,
persons who serve as genetic,
rel igious or other types of counselors should lead the expec tations of their patien ts / clients!
counselees into a rea listic middle
ground. For some genetic conditions, wonderful advances have
already been made. For others, it
is realistic to hold a certain
amount of technological optimism . Others threaten to remain
intractable for a long lime, if
not indefinitely. Responsible parents/ decision-makers will try to
assess the appropriateness of
hope in new developments as a
consideration in their dedding.
As has been mentioned above,
however, th is docs not exonerate
willful ignorance in situations
Linacre Quart.erly

where available information could
make a concrete difference in the
genetic well-being of children.
Conclusion
The reader will have discerned
that this treatment of the dimensions of and considera tions in genetic decision-making has been
decidedly shallow. Each of the
seventeen aspects presented deserves considerable expansion and
analysis. My purpose, however,
has been to expose the breadth of
the question of parental genetic
responsibility. I hope to have provided an adequate framework
within which others can join in
the pursuit of these important
matters in grea ter detail.
1 would like to observe, in con cluding, that there exist important differences between moral
obligations and ethical refJections
on t he one hand, and legal sanctions on the other. Legality and
ethicality are by no means coterminous. I propose that we
impute moral obligations to prospective parents, and anticipate
social a nd ecclesial atmospheres
of opinion in which people increasingly ex p e c t active responsibility-taking for g e net i c
well-being of offspring. Bu t this
should be tempered by a sincere
concern for persons who are faced
with t he exceedingly painful and
complex decisions which arise in
this area . I would not wish to be
perceived as a fashioner of new
burdens for others to carry.
Rather, I would insist that all of
us have an obligation to protect
the moral agent from any kind of
short-circui ting of the decisional
November, 1976

process. Therefore, any legislative intervention or other coercive
measures compromising t hat
process are vehemently to be
opposed.J2
There are and will be cases in
which conflicts of opinion arise
between a family and its physicians; it can be appropriate to
appeal to court-appoin ted arbitrat.ing, presumably dispassionate, third parties. JJ Finally, beca use they are decidedly exceptional,H those parents whose procreative behavior is grossly irresponsible, to the extent of perhaps necessitating public intervention, have not been considered here. There are ample precedents for court intervention in
par a II e I child-rearing circumstances, and it does not seem
likely to me that future judgments should stray far from
these.
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Aesculapius and Zadok:
Medical and Priestly Authority
John F. X. Sheehan, S.J .

Father Sheehart has been a
member of the M arquette Uni o e r sit y Theology Department
since 1970 and has served as its
chairman since 1972.
The author of a number oj ar-

ticles and reviews, he has written
three books and a fourth is
scheduled for publication by the

Paulist Press in January, 1977.
Physicians and priests have
much in common. Friends and
detractors of each group have
generally been in agreement on
that. Those who find physicians
to be a beneficent lot, generaUy
thin k well of priests; those who
are "turned off' by physicians
and find them a loof and arrogant,
often entertain dark thoughts
aboul the priestly caste.
Detractors have noted traits
common to the two groups. Each
- at least sometimes - wears
special garb; ea ch seems a trifle
overconcerned with being add ressed by proper title; each
caste, no matter how narrow its
education may be, offers to its
members at least a special techr..ical vocabulary which seems to t he hostile - designed to baffl e the outsider.
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Perhaps one furth er common
denominator is found between
the hard-working priest outside
academe and the harried physician in practice. Neither of them
has opportunity to do much refl ecting on the nature of his professional life. There is too much
to be done to waste time thinking about it!
Others have more leisure. A
fairly recent book , t he work of a
medical socio logist and a research
physician , offers an unusual opport uni ty for reflection. ( Models
0/ Madness. Models 0/ M edicine:
Siegler and Osmond, MacMillan,
1974 ). In the major insight that
interests us, the two authors lean
heavi ly on an unpubl ished manuscript by T. T . Paterson. The
results of tbat study may be
properly rephrased as follows:
medical authority derives from
three sources; some of it is moral;
some of it is sapientiai; what rema ins, the most important part,
is simply Aesculapian. This last
is not simply charismatic. It does
not flow from personality. But it
is not precisely sapientiai or moral. No government confers it with
a li cense. (A non-licensed med ical student may be possessed of
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